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elements within Yugoslavia. Since a direct military attack would run the great risk of war, and since economic sanctions had already done no more than to drive Tito into the arms of the West, the best chance of eliminating the regime was through some form of internal coup. This, the "Review" tended to believe, was the principal aim of current Soviet strategy.

### C. THE ANALYSIS OF THE NEAR EAST

The "Near East" (also called "Middle East" and "Near and Middle East"), as understood in the Review, included Greece, along with India and Pakistan, but did not include Burma or Yugoslavia. Odd as this arrangement might seem in some ways, it made a certain amount of sense so far as the editors were concerned, because the Communist pressure on Greece was viewed as part of a Soviet flanking movement which had to be understood in the context of the Near East.

The first issue of the "Review" explains the "second priority" accorded the Near East among US security considerations as follows:

"As a region, the Near and Middle East is of second priority from the point of view of containing the USSR and eventually redressing the balance of power---but within the general area the situation in Greece is of great importance and the utmost urgency, while the situation with respect to Palestine is extremely dangerous. The region differs from both Western Europe and the Far East in that (except for India) its human and material resources are inadequate for the development of a significant power potential. Its great importance, second only to that of Western Europe, lies in its strategic location as a barrier to further Soviet expansion, as an essential link in Communications between the West and East, as a potential base from which power developed elsewhere could be brought to bear on the sources of Soviet power, and in the vital importance of the oil of the Persian Gulf states to the Western powers." 1

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Of the current situation in Greece, the "Review" commented: "... At any time, US armed intervention may be required to prevent its collapse and to restore the situation. The loss of Greece would not only impair the strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean, but would also have profound psychological repercussions throughout Western Europe and the Near and Middle East."

The paragraph regarding Palestine argues the case generally laid in the various formal CIA estimates on the subject, but does so rather more strongly than any of them.

"The situation with respect to Palestine is fraught with peculiar difficulties and dangers. Zionist leadership has pursued its objectives without regard for the consequences... The Arab reaction is bitter and potentially violent, endangering not only the Jews in Palestine, but also the strategic interests of the Western powers in the Near and Middle East.... Their (the Arabs') principal means of retaliation against the US and the UK would be the cancellation of British and American oil concessions. Since the Arabs could not operate the oil properties themselves, and since, in these circumstances, they would be in desperate need of popular support, it is probable that they would eventually transfer these concessions to the Soviet Union. Soviet control of Arabian oil would be disastrous to Western interests. This course of events, of which there is a real and grave danger, would not only wreck the strategic position of the Western powers in the Near and Middle East, but would also have a fatal effect upon the economic recovery of Western Europe and would seriously impair the war potential of the Western Powers."

Having thus summarized the strategic significance of the Near East, the "Review" was left without a great deal to say in succeeding issues. With respect to Greece, the tone of the "Review" was uniformly pessimistic up to the summer of 1948 when the supporting Satellite front was broken by the defection of Yugoslavia. Until then, the strength and backing of the guerrillas on the one hand, and the

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confused Greek political situation through which US policy had to work on the other added up to a gloomy forecast, generally noted briefly each month. Decisive events always seemed possible, but they never came to pass.

The same was true of Palestine. The British mandate was withdrawn; the State of Israel was established and recognized; a Jewish-Arab war began as predicted; the Arabs threatened a boycott; the Jews took advantage of their military superiority; the United Nations mediator went to Palestine and was assassinated; a truce was eventually arranged. Nothing was settled; violence continued and varied only in degree. The Arab world was embittered, and the United States had become one object of that bitterness. The Arabs, however, were powerless in the face of Jewish strength and their own divided councils.

Under the circumstances, the "Review" had little latitude for anything more than news reporting. The underlying coordinated estimate held good, however: that little in the situation favored the United States. At the same time, the future for the USSR in the Near East looked bright, depending on how the Kremlin wished to exploit it.

The brightest spot in the Near East, according to the Review, was Turkey which remained firm and represented the anchor of United States interests in the eastern Mediterranean. In Egypt, as in the Near East generally, the nationalist movement was strong and much depended on the success of established British influence and diplomacy. During the period in question the Anglo-Egyptian dispute over the Sudan remained just under the surface.

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Saudi Arabia was safe in the friendly control of Ibn Saud; yet a pro-Jewish policy in the Near East risked even his friendship.

So long as Ahmed Qavam remained in power in Iran, the interests of the United States were well served. Qavam's policies were not only generally favorable to the policy of containment in the area, but he seemed able, on occasion, to out-manuever the Russians themselves.

But Qavam, like his successors, however willing they might be to follow the policies of the United States as affecting Russia, resisted all pressure for internal social reforms. The result was social unrest in Iran favorable to Communist purposes. As in Greece and Palestine, however, nothing decisive happened. The "Review's" report usually left the impression that the situation was subject to radical change at any moment.

The principal interest in India during this period centers in the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, which always held the threat of war between the two new-born countries. The "Review" admitted the possibility but doubted the event.

In September, 1948, in connection with a general review of the situation in the "periphery of Asia" the "Monthly" arrived at a summary of conditions in the Near East as an area where: "The US (is) at a present disadvantage vis-a-vis the USSR. US policy is confronted with the problem of striking a balance between supporting local nationalist aspirations and maintaining the colonial economic interests of countries to whom aid has been pledged in Western Europe. Existing UK influence is of considerable value in solving this problem and, particularly in the Near East, cooperation to preserve stability is now well developed. But the USSR is wholly free to champion the ambitions of indigenous peoples, and can be certain that immediate Soviet interests are being advanced and that US and Western European interests are being impeded by the mere fact of social, economic, and political disorder."

The "Review" goes on to say that the most satisfactory solution would come if Colonial powers and their former dependencies could work out satisfactory solutions faster than the USSR could exploit indigenous dissatisfaction. Another way was for the United States to take steps to supplant the influence of former Colonial powers, a move which, however, was being met by Soviet propaganda against "US imperialism."

"The US security problem created by this general situation is a long-term one. It is primarily concerned with the relative strategic positions of the two global powers, one of which is essentially a land-air power, and the other of which is essentially a sea-air power."

In this context, Turkey had become "the strong western anchor of the US position in the western periphery of Asia." In Iran, however:

"Internal social conditions lend themselves to subversive exploitation by the USSR, and the Iranian government is habituated to a foreign policy that works by forcing interested outsiders to bid against each other. Although this bargaining habit is now held in check by the unmistakable threat of the USSR, it must be assumed that US influence will be exactly measured by the reality of US aid and by continual Iranian estimates of the depth and permanency of US interest."

The Arab states of the Near and Middle East present a very unsatisfactory picture. The tendency of the region to become a power vacuum, though visible ever since the breakup of the Turkish Empire, has been speeded up by the situation in Palestine which has created local power aspirations and at the same time revealed the absence of power resources that alone could force a final decision at the local level. At the moment, the Israeli military position is favorable enough to encourage intransigent expansionism. The Arab states, however, are capable of maintaining a prolonged guerrilla activity that can constitute a serious drain on Israeli economy. Determined action by the United Nations might force a final territorial settlement, but would leave Arab-Jewish tensions unresolved. Continuation of the present indecisive situation encourages all elements on both sides to seek external assistance. The situation is made further unstable by the internal weaknesses of the individual Arab states. With the exception of the states of the Arabian Peninsula, Arab governments are in constant danger of adopting extreme courses in order to maintain political control. US influence is at a low ebb and an improvement cannot be

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in the near future. The opportunities for Soviet exploitation are manifold, but there is little concrete evidence that a stepped-up campaign for this purpose has been initiated. Unless direct military action in Europe is contemplated, Soviet interests in the Near and Middle East are adequately forwarded by minor actions to encourage and prolong the present chaotic situation. This in itself lays a basis for the future by discrediting the purposes of the US and the UK." 1

The November estimate said that "In the Near East initiative lies almost wholly in Israeli hands and the Arab States are uncomfortably suspended between the over-stimulated opinions of their citizens and their suspicion of each other." 2 In December, there were new worries over Greece where the military campaign had bogged down and the new government was said to be worse than the old. "In relation to the stated intention of the US to remain in Greece and, more significantly, in relation to the Anglo-American strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean, two possible conclusions emerge: (1) the capacity and willingness of the Greek people to play the part assigned to them by US policy has been overestimated; or, (2) the requirements of enabling them to play this part have been underestimated." In Turkey, the Russians were employing the diplomacy of insult. In Iran, "leaders still find it safer and more profitable to continue to cooperate with the US than to seek to conciliate the USSR." 3

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Security  
Position in  
European-  
Mediterranean  
Area and the  
Far East,"  
September 14

The February, 1949 issue contains a full-length estimate on the Near East with reference to each major country within the region. The situation remaining basically the same, however, this produced little that has not been said before. The summary is as follows:

"In the Middle East, the problems connected with US security interests are expanding, but the degree of regional stability called for to protect these interests is far from achieved. The most

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significant sources of instability are the situation in Greece, the superior power position of Israel, and political and social tensions in individual Arab States. The present anchor of the US position is Turkey; but the strength of this anchor is relative and not absolute. Its immediate value, however, enables Turkey to stake out a plausible claim for a more precise US commitment. UN security interests, now concentrated in the Arab States, interlock with US security interests at almost every point and their mutual support is becoming more essential to the effective maintenance of either.

With the air full of defense pacts, Greece and Turkey have become interested in their positions with respect to an Atlantic Pact. A pressure exists to bring the Eastern Mediterranean and the proposed Atlantic defense system together. For the moment this pressure has been checked, but the way is open for its renewal if and when Italy becomes part of an Atlantic Pact. 1.

The development of Israel and the concurrent deterioration of the Arab States internally and as a group had the effect of upsetting any stability the region might have enjoyed. Israel, while emerging in 1949 as unquestionably the new military power in the area and the one potentially able to maintain its stability, was in no position to do so because of Arab hatred and the somewhat aggressive ambitions of the Israeli. The Arabs did not have the military establishment to check the Israeli, but the "Review" believed them capable of almost indefinite guerrilla operations.

Driven by their current weakness and the demands of their people, Arab governments seemingly could not help but be tempted to bargain with the USSR. Yet, during 1947-1950 the USSR---despite a flow of plausible rumors,---seemed to do little to exploit the opportunity; nor were there any moves on the part of the Arabs that could cause very much concern.

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